We suggest a general logical framework for causal dynamic reasoning. As a first step, we introduce a uniform structural formalism and assign it two kinds of semantics, abstract dynamic models and relational models. The corresponding completeness results are proved. As a second step, we extend the structural formalism to a two-sorted state-transition calculus, and prove its completeness with respect to the associated relational semantics.
As a starting point, we will contend that, at the most fundamental level, an adequate logical description of a dynamic world can be achieved by defining an appropriate dynamic consequence relation among (propositions denoting) temporally extended events and processes. In this respect, the logical formalism, described below, can be viewed as a particular implementation of the 'dynamic turn in logic' advocated already in [12] . Namely, it is a substructural consequence relation defined directly on sequences of propositions. It will be shown, in particular, that the theory of such an inference relation can be developed to the depth and levels comparable to theories of ordinary consequence relations.
A more specific idea we adhere to in this study is that the above mentioned dynamic consequence relation should reflect the basic causal relationships among events and processes. In other words, we believe that a natural and systematic description of dynamic domains can be given once we settle what causes or enables what in these domains; the rest of the properties and facts about the domain or situation should follow (at least in principle) by logical means. Furthermore, the rules and postulates that characterize such a causal consequence relation should be viewed not as entailments that follow logically from the meaning of the consequence relation and propositions involved, but rather as nontrivial claims about the (causal) structure of the dynamic world. Accordingly, such postulates provide an indirect, 'functional' description of the concept of causation itself.
The idea that causal relations should constitute the basis of representation and description of dynamic universes is not new; as a matter of fact, it is widely used as a guiding principle in the main fields that deal with such dynamic descriptions, such as linguistic semantics, artificial intelligence and even general theory of computation. Taking only a few examples, it has been persuasively argued in [11] that the socalled temporal semantics of natural language should not primarily deal with time at all, but rather with representation of causality and goal-directed action (see also [14] for a similar approach). Similarly, a number of causal approaches to reasoning about action and change have been developed in Artificial Intelligence (see, e.g., [7] ). In fact, our approach can be seen as a logical counterpart of a qualitative causal modeling in AI developed a long time ago in [5] .
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce first a basic structural calculus of dynamic inference that is defined on sequences of propositions (called processes) and satisfies certain 'sequential' variants of familiar inference rules such as Identity, Monotonicity and Cut. This calculus will be assigned first an abstract monoidbased dynamic semantics, and the completeness results will be proved. Then we will show that the latter semantics can be transformed into more familiar relational, or transition models. Moreover, it will be shown that our dynamic inference constitutes in this respect a generalization of the inference relation of dynamic predicate logic [8] .
As a second step, we will introduce a two-sorted extension of the basic formalism in which the underlying set of propositions will be split into transitions (actions) proper, and static propositions (also known as fluents, or tests). This extension of the formalism will be called a state-transition calculus. It will be shown that (under some additional conditions) the state transition calculus is also complete for the corresponding relational semantics.
The structural dynamic calculus
The language of the calculus will be a set L = {A, B, C, . . . } of propositions that will denote primitive transitions or events. Finite sequences of events will be called processes, and we will use small letters a, b , c, . . . to denote such processes. The set of all processes will be denoted by L * . It will include, in particular, an empty sequence denoted by . As usual, ab will denote the concatenation of sequences a and b from L * (and similarly for aA, aAb, etc.). A dynamic consequence relation will be a set of rules, or sequents, of the form a b , where a, b ∈ L * . The intended meaning of such rules is that a processes a causes (or enables) a process b . This consequence relation will be required to satisfy the following postulates:
Identity
. Left Monotonicity If a b , then Aa b .
Cut
If a b and ab c, then a bc.
Already the very form of our sequents involving sequences of propositions (instead of usual sets) indicates that the dynamic consequence relation is substructural, that is, it does not satisfy the usual structural rules for consequence relations such as contraction, permutation and weakening. Note, in particular, that a minimal premise or a conclusion of a sequent is not an empty set, but an empty sequence . Still, we will show in what follows that the analysis and representation of our dynamic calculus can proceed quite along the same lines as the usual theoretical development for standard consequence relations.
Though all the above postulates constitute a certain weakening of well-known structural rules for a (classical) sequent calculus, we argue that these postulates should rather be viewed as informed claims about the structure of processes and their interactions. In other words, we see the above postulates as assertions that have a non-trivial content that jointly determine the structure of the dynamic universe (more exactly, of its representation). Varying or extending these postulates (as will actually be done in subsequent sections) means changing the structure and relations of this universe.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that our postulates preserve locality and continuity of processes. Thus, if the premises of some postulate describe relations among contiguous processes, then its conclusion will also have this property. This feature is especially evident in the form of the Cut postulate, which does not allows us to infer, e.g., a c from a b and ab c; such an inference would break continuity and create non-local influences.
Remark As could be noticed already at this stage, the sequents of our dynamic calculus, though interpreted informally as causal claims, do not correspond precisely to a commonsense notion of causation. A primary witness of this discrepancy is a postulate of Left Monotonicity that allows us to strengthen the premises of a rule with additional propositions (though in a restricted way). Apparent counterexamples to the corresponding strengthening of commonsense causal claims are easy to come by, since Striking a match causes it to light obviously does not imply Putting a match in water and then striking it causes it to light. Unfortunately, an attempt to establish a precise correspondence between our formal causal rules and their commonsense counterparts would bring us far beyond the scope of the present study. So we mention only that arguments of the above kind are quite familiar to logicians in the form of reservations against taking classical material implication as a representation of commonsense conditionals in general. And in the latter case, such arguments do not deprave the classical implication of its role in logic. Similarly, the assertions made by our dynamic rules could be called proto-causal claims. We argue, however, that such proto-causal claims form an essential ingredient of the corresponding (more complex) commonsense causal assertions. Moreover, 'monotonic' causal claims of a similar kind form a basis for a quite successful causal theory of reasoning about action and change in AI (see, e.g., [4, 7] ). This theory shows, in particular, that the above-mentioned counterexamples can be successfully dealt with as part of its general nonmonotonic component.
Due to the Horn form of the rules characterizing a dynamic consequence relation, intersection of a set of consequence relations is again a consequence relation. This implies, in particular, that, for any set of sequents, there exists a least dynamic consequence relation containing it. Now we introduce the basic notion of a theory of a dynamic consequence relation. Intuitively, theories characterize admissible sets of processes (with respect to a given dynamic consequence relation). Definition 2.1 A set U of processes will be called a theory of a dynamic consequence relation if, whenever a b holds, and s is some process such that sa ∈ U, then sab ∈ U.
Slightly reformulated, a theory is a set of processes such that whenever it includes a process s that ends with a (as its end-segment), and a causes b , then the process sb should also belong to the set.
An important property of our dynamic theories (common with ordinary Tarski theories) is that intersections of theories are again theories of a consequence relation. This immediately implies that, for any set of processes there exists a least theory containing it. In other words, we have a natural closure operator Th(V) that assigns any set V of processes a unique least theory containing it.
The following simple lemma provides a direct syntactic description of the least theory containing a single process. It will be used in what follows.
Proof Let T a denote the set {ab | a b }. It is easy to see that any theory containing a should include also T a . Note also that a ∈ T a , since a by Identity and Left Monotonicity. Hence it is sufficient to show that T a is a theory. Assume that c d and sc ∈ T a for some process s. Then sc = ab , for some b such that a b . Now, c d implies sc d by Left Monotonicity, and hence ab d. Therefore a bd by Cut, and consequently ab d = scd ∈ T a . Thus, T a is a theory of . This completes the proof.
Dynamic monoid semantics
We will introduce first the following very abstract notion of a dynamic semantics.
By a dynamic frame we will mean an arbitrary monoid (P, ·, 1). In other words, · is an associative binary operation on P, and u · 1 = 1 · u = u, for any u ∈ P. Elements of P will be called paths. The operation · on P can be viewed as a concatenation of paths. It can be canonically extended to sets of paths as follows: if U, V ⊆ P, then
This extension is also an associative operation.
In what follows, we will often omit the operation sign · and write ab instead of a · b . In addition, x y will denote the fact that y = xz, for some z. It is easy to verify that is a partial order. We will call it a pref ix relation on paths.
Definition 3.1 An abstract dynamic model is a tuple D = (P, U, ·, 1, V), where (P, ·, 1) is a dynamic frame, U ⊆ P (called the set of allowable paths), while V is a valuation function assigning each proposition from the language a subset of P, that is,
A set of dynamic models will be called a dynamic (monoid) semantics.
A dynamic model can be seen as a restriction of a dynamic frame to the set of allowable paths. In other words, it can be viewed as a partial monoid in which the concatenation operation · is defined only if it produces an element of U.
1 Note, however, that the valuation function V also becomes a partial function on this view.
As a preparation, we will extend the valuation function to sequences of propositions (i.e., processes) from L * as follows:
We will extend V also to an empty sequence by stipulating V( ) = {1}. Every dynamic semantics D determines a dynamic consequence relation D defined as follows:
The following simple lemma verifies that the above relation satisfies all the postulates of a dynamic consequence relation.
Lemma 3.1 D is a dynamic consequence relation.
Proof Identity is immediate.
Left Monotonicity. If Aa D b , then, for some dynamic model in D, there exist u and x such that ux ∈ U, x ∈ V(Aa), but there is no y such that uxy ∈ U and y ∈ V(b ). By definition, x = zt, where z ∈ V(A) and t ∈ V(a). Now if u 1 = uz, we have u 1 t = ux ∈ U, and uxy = u 1 ty, and consequently a D b .
Cut. If a D bc, then, for some dynamic model in D, there must exist u and x such that ux ∈ U, x ∈ V(a), but there is no y such that uxy ∈ U and y ∈ V(bc). But if a D b , then uxz ∈ U, for some z ∈ V(b ), and hence xz ∈ V(ab ). On the other hand, if it were the case that uxzy 0 ∈ U, for some y 0 ∈ V(c), then we would have zy 0 ∈ V(bc), contrary to the supposition. Hence ab D c.
If a consequence relation coincides with D , for some dynamic semantics D, we will say that is generated by D.
It turns out that, similarly to ordinary consequence relations (see, e.g., [6] , or [3] ), any dynamic consequence relation can be generated by a canonical dynamic semantics constructed from the set of its theories.
Given a theory U of a consequence relation , we can construct an associated
, where the dynamic frame is the set of all processes L * with an operation of concatenation and as a unit, while V is a trivial function V(A) = {A}. Let T be the set of such dynamic models, for all theories of . Then we have Proof We have to show that a b holds iff for any theory U of , and any sequence s, if sa ∈ U, then sab ∈ U. The direction from left to right follows directly from the definition of a theory. In the other direction, we take s to be an empty sequence, and choose U = Th(a). Then ab ∈ Th(a) and therefore a b by Lemma 2.1. This completes the proof.
As a result, we obtain that dynamic consequence relations are complete with respect to the dynamic monoid semantics.
Corollary 3.3
is a dynamic consequence relation if and only if it is generated by a dynamic monoid semantics. Actually, the above result can be strengthened by making use of the fact that the canonical dynamic semantics T , described above, is a dynamic semantics of a very special kind. Its specific properties are reflected in the following definition.
Definition 3.2 A dynamic semantics D will be called homogeneous if
• all its dynamic models involve the same dynamic frame (P, ·, 1) and the same valuation function V.
Thus, the variation of models in a homogeneous semantics reduces to the variation of admissible sets U of paths. Now the Representation Theorem 3.2 immediately implies the following
Corollary 3.4 is a dynamic consequence relation if f it is generated by some homogeneous dynamic semantics.
The above result will imply a number of consequences important for our study.
Another consequence of the above representation theorem is that dynamic consequence relations are uniquely determined by their theories. Moreover, for more expressive languages the above Representation Theorem can serve as a basis of constructing full-fledged semantics. In this case theories of a consequence relation will play, eventually, the role of its canonical models. In particular, just as for ordinary inference relations, inclusion among consequence relations amounts to inverse inclusion for their sets of theories. Accordingly, imposing further requirements on our consequence relations will amount to imposing additional properties on the associated theories.
Remark To conclude our discussion in this section, we should mention an important dimension of generality that is embodied in the above notion of a dynamic monoid semantics and, in particular, in the very idea of allowable paths. As the reader may have noticed, the set of allowable paths is not required to be closed with respect to concatenation or sub-paths, so concatenations of allowable paths are not always allowed, and not all parts of allowable paths constitute allowable paths by themselves. Now, an important way to see this consists in viewing a compound process as possibly proceeding 'in one leap' in which we cannot temporally (or sequentially) separate its constitutive parts. As an important extreme case, all the transitions in the process may be performed concurrently. For instance, a compound process of carrying a table by two people could still be described as a path a · b consisting of two concurrent actions of carrying, respectively, the left and right edge of the table. The causal and inference relations of such a process with other processes cannot be reduced directly to corresponding relations for its two components. Speaking more generally, the general dynamic monoid semantics allows us to accommodate the basic idea of [10] that, unlike the sequential modeling, the evolution of time and information need not be synchronized.
Relational semantics
In this section we are going to show that our dynamic consequence relations can also be given a (suitably generalized) relational semantics.
We begin with the following well-known notion of a relational semantics.
, where S is a set of states, L is a set of propositions, and F is a function assigning each proposition from L a binary relation on S:
For any binary relation R, dom(R) will denote its domain, and range(R)-its range. The function F can be canonically extended to sequences of propositions:
where • denotes the composition of binary relations. We will extend F also to an empty sequence by stipulating
Now, in order to provide a semantics for our dynamic inference, the above notion of a relational model has to be generalized as follows.
Definition 4.2 A generalized relational model is a quadruple
where (S, L, F) is a relational model, and is a subset of states called termination states.
The notion of a termination state is actually known in the computational literature. In the latter, it denotes states in which a program, or its parts, successfully terminate, as opposed to other states that do not have computational meaning. In our setting, we will stretch this notion to a general distinction between real and virtual states, guided by an idea that atomic transitions in a compound process are not necessary separated by real states. As we already mentioned at the end of the preceding section, we allow for a possibility that a process b may proceed in one leap, in which we cannot observe, or single out, sequential parts and associated intermediate states.
Of course, this idea conflicts somewhat with the very notion of a relational model, where transitions are def ined as pairs of states. Still, the suggested way out consists in distinguishing between states that are actual (real) and all other, virtual states that may be viewed as purely theoretical constructs without 'physical' meaning. This distinction will also serve as a preparation for the state-transition calculus that will be introduced later. Now we are ready to formulate the following definition of validity for dynamic inference rules in this semantics: Definition 4.3 A dynamic rule a b will be said to be valid in a generalized relational model M if, for any states s ∈ S and t ∈ such that (s, t) ∈ F(a), there exists a state r ∈ such that (t, r) ∈ F(b ).
M will denote the set of sequents that are valid in a relational model M.
Then the above definition can be compactly written as follows:
To begin with, it is easy to verify the following
Lemma 4.1 If M is a generalized relational model, then M is a dynamic consequence relation.
In order to show that this relational semantics is also adequate for dynamic consequence relations, it is sufficient to demonstrate that any dynamic monoid semantics can be transformed into an equivalent relational model.
For the purposes of the construction that follows, we will use an expression x ∈ U ∈ D as a shorthand for x ∈ U, for an admissible set U of some dynamic model from D. Now, given such an admissible set U, let U↓ denote the set of prefixes of the elements of U, that is,
Then the set of states of the relational model corresponding to a monoid semantics D will be a disjoint union of all U↓, for every admissible set U. As usual, in order to achieve disjointness, each path x ∈ U↓ will be indexed with the corresponding set U to become a new object x U . As a result, we obtain the following construction of a generalized relational model M D :
The following theorem shows that the resulting relational model validates the same rules as the source dynamic semantics.
Theorem 4.2 If M D is the relational model corresponding to the dynamic semantics
Proof Note that, for any process a, (s, t) ∈ F(a) if and only if (s, t) = (x U , y U ), for some x, y such that y = xz, for some z ∈ F(a), and y y 0 , for some y 0 ∈ U ∈ D.
Assume first that
for some x, y such that y = xz, for some z ∈ F(a), and y y 0 , for some y 0 ∈ U ∈ D. Since U is an admissible set of a dynamic model in D, we have xzz 1 
Then clearly r ∈ and (t, r) ∈ F(b ).
This gives the direction from left to right. Now assume that a MD b and ux ∈ U ∈ D, for some x ∈ V(a). Then let us put s = u U and t = (ux) U . Clearly t ∈ and (s, t) ∈ F(a). Since a MD b , there exists r ∈ such that (t, r) ∈ F(b ). By the definition of F, this can happen only if r = (uxy) U , for some y ∈ V(b ), and therefore uxy ∈ U, which shows that a D b holds. This completes the proof.
The above result immediately implies that dynamic consequence relations are also complete for the above notion of validity in generalized relational models.
Corollary 4.3 is a dynamic consequence relation if f it coincides with M , for some generalized relational model M.
As a matter of fact, the above completeness result can be strengthened by exploiting the fact that the dynamic semantics can be safely restricted to homogeneous one (see Corollary 3.4) .
Recall that a relational model is deterministic if F(A) is a partial function, that is, for any A ∈ P, if (s, t) ∈ F(A) and (s, r) ∈ F(A), then t = r. Now, it is easy to verify that the relational model corresponding to the canonical dynamic semantics T by the above construction is actually deterministic. Consequently, we immediately obtain that, at this stage, imposing determinism does not produce new valid rules of dynamic inference.
Corollary 4.4 is a dynamic consequence relation if and only if it is generated by a generalized deterministic relational model.
This result will no longer hold, however, when we will impose some additional conditions on dynamic consequence relations. Remark It should be noted that the above postulate, when compared with Left Monotonicity, makes vivid another essential difference between our consequence relations and common sequent calculi, namely the fact that both antecedents and consequents of our rules are interpreted conjunctively, unlike the usual, disjunctive understanding of succedents in sequents.
The postulates of sequential consequence relations almost coincide with the axiomatization of the calculus G μ presented in [9] with the only exception that the latter does not have the Identity postulate (but appropriately restricts the discussion to non-empty sequences). As has been shown by Kanazawa, such consequence relations can be given a relational semantics of the kind used in dynamic predicate logic of [8] . In what follows we will reproduce this result as an 'unfolding' of the corresponding representation theorem.
To begin with, note that sequentiality can be alternatively characterized by strengthening the Cut rule to the following 'contextual' Cut:
C-Cut If a bd and ab c, then a bc.
Indeed, the original Cut rule is a special case of C-Cut (when d = ). Moreover, the latter implies Right Anti-Monotonicity: Identity implies ab by Left Monotonicity, and hence if a bc holds, then a b follows by C-Cut. In the other direction, given Right Anti-Monotonicity, C-Cut is derivable from Cut, since a bd implies a b .
Sequentiality corresponds to the following restriction of the dynamic monoid semantics:
Thus, in a sequential dynamic model the set of admissible paths is interval-closed with respect to the prefix relation . The next lemma shows that such a semantics generates a sequential consequence relation.
Lemma 5.1 If D is a sequential dynamic semantics, then D is a sequential consequence relation.
Proof We need only to check Right Anti-Monotonicity. If a D b , then there exist a dynamic model and s ∈ P such that sx ∈ U, for x ∈ V(a), and there is no y such that sxy ∈ U and y ∈ V(b ). Assume that uxz ∈ U, for some z ∈ V(b B). Then z = z 1 z 2 , where z 1 ∈ V(b ) and z 2 ∈ V(B), and hence sxz 1 ∈ U by sequentiality, which contradicts the supposition. Therefore a D b B.
A theory of a consequence relation will be called sequential if it is interval-closed with respect to the prefix relation on processes. As before, the following technical lemma plays the main role in the subsequent representation theorem.
Lemma 5.2 If is a sequential consequence relation, then Th(a) is a sequential theory.
Proof Given Right Anti-Monotonicity, Lemma 2.1 implies that if ab B ∈ Th(a), then ab ∈ Th(a). It can be easily seen that this property ensures sequentiality of Th(a).
As a result, we can extend the main Representation Theorem 3.2 above to sequential inference and immediately obtain the following completeness result:
Corollary 5.3 A dynamic consequence relation is sequential if and only if it is generated by a sequential dynamic semantics.
As before, we can use Corollary 3.4 to conclude that the sequential dynamic semantics can be safely restricted to a homogeneous one.
Corollary 5.4 A dynamic consequence relation is sequential if and only if it is generated by a homogeneous sequential dynamic semantics.
This strengthening of the general representation result will be used in the next section.
Relational dynamic inference
It turns out that sequential consequence relations can be given a simpler relational semantics. More precisely, sequential dynamic inference amounts to validity in plain relational models, that is, models in which all states are termination ones. Definition 5.2 A dynamic rule a b will be said to be valid in a plain relational model M if
The above notion of validity corresponds to what has been called Update-toDomain Consequence in [12] , and it describes the inference relation adopted in dynamic predicate logic of [8] . Unfolding the definition, it says that a b holds iff, for any (s, t) ∈ F(a) there exists r ∈ S such that (t, r) ∈ F(b ).
To begin with, we have the following
Lemma 5.5 If M is a relational model, then M is a sequential consequence relation.
The proof amounts to a simple verification of Right Anti-Monotonicity. In order to show that the relational semantics is also adequate for sequential consequence relations, we will make use of Corollary 3.4 and show that any homogeneous sequential dynamic semantics can be transformed into an equivalent relational model. Note, however, that the construction below is essentially different from the translation of the general dynamic semantics, described in the preceding section. Most importantly, the construction below creates an indeterministic model even from homogeneous dynamic semantics.
Given a homogeneous sequential dynamic semantics D with a common frame (P, ·, 1), we will construct a relational model M D as follows:
• The set of states S is the set of all paths P together with all labeled paths from the the disjoint union of D:
• For any A ∈ L, F(A) is a set of all pairs (s, t) from S such that, for some paths x, y ∈ P, y = x · V(A), and one of the following cases holds:
The following theorem shows that the constructed relational model validates the same rules as the source sequential semantics. Proof For any s ∈ S,ŝ will denote the underlying path, that is,û = u andû U = u. Also, to simplify the notation, for a process a, we will use [a] to denote V(a). Note, in particular, that if (s, t) ∈ F(a), then alwayst =ŝ [a] .
Assume first that a D b and (s, t) ∈ F(a). We have to consider two cases. If t ∈ P, then let r = t [b ] . Clearly, r ∈ S and (t, r) ∈ F(b ), as required. So assume now that t = x U , for some x ∈ U ∈ D. In this case we have x =ŝ[a], and therefore As an immediate consequence of Corollary 5.4, we conclude with the following completeness result.
Corollary 5.7 A dynamic consequence relation is sequential if and only if it coincides with a dynamic inference generated by some plain relational model.
As we noted in the course of the above construction, the relational models obtained by transforming sequential dynamic models are not deterministic, in general. As we are going to see in the next section, this liberty is essential, because restriction of arbitrary relational models to deterministic ones will make valid an additional postulate of dynamic inference.
Deterministic inference
A dynamic consequence relation will be called deterministic if it is sequential and satisfies the following postulate: Cumulativity If a Bc, then aB c. It should be clear that a repeated application of Cumulativity generates the following structural rule for processes: a bc ab c Now, in deterministic consequence relations, any rule a bc is reducible to a pair of simpler rules:
Lemma 6.1 If is a deterministic consequence relation, then a b c if and only if a b and ab c.
Proof The direction from left to right follows from Cumulativity and Right AntiMonotonicity, while the opposite direction follows directly by Cut.
As a consequence, any rule can now be reduced to a set of rules a A involving only singular conclusions (including ). Moreover, this property can be viewed in some sense as a characteristic property of deterministic dynamic relations. In order to show this, let us introduce the following notions. Let us say that a sequent a b is singular, if b is either an atom B, or an empty sequence . Then a singular consequence relation, defined below, can be viewed as a restriction of a general dynamic consequence relation to singular sequents. Definition 6.1 A singular dynamic consequence relation is a set of singular sequents that satisfies Left Monotonicity and Identity.
It can be easily verified that a set of singular sequents belonging to an arbitrary dynamic consequence relation forms a singular consequence relation. Moreover, it can be shown that the above two postulates exhaust the structural properties of such an inference relation.
2 So a singular consequence relation is actually a very simple inference relation. Now, given a singular consequence relation , we can inductively extend it to arbitrary sequents a b as follows: if a b is already defined, then we stipulate that a b A holds if and only if both a b and ab A hold. Let m denote the resulting consequence relation. Then the next result shows that any deterministic consequence relation can be viewed as a definitional extension of a singular consequence relation. For the direction from left to right, assume that is deterministic, and let 0 be the set of singular sequents from . Clearly, m 0 is a singular consequence relation. Also, m 0 is included in (since is closed with respect to Cumulativity). Moreover, due to Lemma 6.1, any sequent from can be obtained, ultimately, from the singular sequents of 0 by applying the inductive construction. Thus, coincides with m 0 . This completes the proof. Now let us turn to a semantic description. A dynamic monoid semantics of deterministic consequence relations can be defined as follows.
Theorem 6.2 is a deterministic consequence relation if and only if
= m 0 , for some singular consequence relation 0 . Proof For the direction from right to left, it is sufficient to show that if 0 is a singular consequence relation, then m 0 is a deterministic consequence relation. Identity is immediate, while both Right Anti-Monotonicity and Cumulativity follow directly from the inductive construction. For the two remaining postulates of deterministic inference, we will show that
Definition 6.2 A dynamic model D = (P, U, ·, 1, V) will be called deterministic, if the valuation function V is singular (that is, V(A) ∈ P, for any A ∈ L)
, and the admissible set U is closed with respect to the prefix relation: if ab ∈ U, then a ∈ U. A dynamic monoid semantics will be called deterministic, if all its dynamic models are deterministic.
The next result verifies that any deterministic dynamic semantics generates a deterministic consequence relation.
Lemma 6.3 If D is a deterministic dynamic semantics, then D is a deterministic consequence relation.
Proof Note first that, due to singularity of V, we have V(a) ∈ P, for any a ∈ L * . As before, to simplify the notation, we will write [a] instead of V(a).
We A theory of a dynamic consequence relation will be called deterministic if it is closed with respect to the prefix relation. Clearly, the canonical dynamic model corresponding to a deterministic theory will be a deterministic model. Moreover, we will show that the corresponding canonical dynamic semantics is fully adequate for deterministic consequence relations.
As before, the set of deterministic theories is closed with respect to intersections, so any set of processes is included in a unique least deterministic theory. As a technical preparation for the next representation theorem, the lemma below gives a direct description of the least deterministic theory containing a given process.
Lemma 6.4 D(a) is a least deterministic theory of a deterministic consequence relation containing a process a if f D(a) = {bc | b a & b c}.
Proof It is easy to check that any deterministic theory containing a should contain also D(a). So we check only that D(a) is a deterministic theory. 
is a set of deterministic theories of a dynamic consequence relation , then is deterministic if and only if
Proof The direction from right to left follows from Lemma 6.3. So let be a deterministic consequence relation. If a b , then a T d b directly from the definition of a theory. Assume then that a T d b , that is, for any s and any U ∈ T d , if sa ∈ U, then sab ∈ U. We take s = and U to be the least deterministic theory containing a. By Lemma 6.4, we obtain ab ∈ D(a), and therefore ab = cd, for some c, d such that c a and c d. Let a = ce, for some e. Then d = eb , and hence c eb . By Cumulativity we conclude ce b , that is a b . This completes the proof.
As a result, we can conclude with
Corollary 6.6 A dynamic consequence relation is deterministic if and only if it is generated by a deterministic dynamic semantics.
Note now that any deterministic dynamic semantics is already sequential, and hence corresponds to some relational model. Moreover, we are going to show that deterministic semantics correspond precisely to deterministic relational models in which the accessibility relations are partial functions.
Lemma 6.7 If M is a deterministic relational model, then M is a deterministic consequence relation.
The proof amounts to a straightforward verification of Cumulativity. As before, in order to show that deterministic consequence relations are complete with respect to deterministic relational models, we will show that any deterministic dynamic semantics can be transformed into an equivalent deterministic relational model. The construction is actually a simplification of the transformation described earlier for general relational models.
Given a deterministic dynamic semantics D, we will construct the corresponding deterministic relational model M D as follows:
It is easy to see that the above relational model is deterministic. The following theorem shows that it validates the same rules as the source dynamic semantics.
Theorem 6.8 If M D is the relational model corresponding to the deterministic dynamic semantics D, then D = MD . Proof In our present (simpler) case we have that (s, t) ∈ F(a) if and only if (s, t)
Assume first that and (s, t) ∈ F(a). Hence (s, t) = (x U , y U ), for some x, y ∈ U ∈ D such that y = xa. Since U is an admissible set, we have xab = yb ∈ U. Let r = (yb ) U . Then clearly (t, r) ∈ F(b ). This gives the direction from left to right. Now assume that a MD b and ma ∈ U, for some m ∈ L * and U ∈ D. Since U is prefix-closed, we also have m ∈ U. So let us put s = m U and t = (ma) U . Clearly (s, t) ∈ F(a). Since a MD b , there exists r ∈ S such that (t, r) ∈ F(b ). By the definition of F, this can happen only if r = (mab ) U , and therefore mab ∈ U, which shows that a D b holds.
Combined with Corollary 6.6, the above correspondence immediately gives us
Corollary 6.9 A dynamic consequence relation is deterministic if and only if it coincides with a dynamic inference generated by some deterministic relational model.
This result concludes our study of the basic variety of dynamic inference.
State-transition calculus
At this stage of our development, we will distinguish between two kinds of events, proper transitions (or actions) and states, or conditions. So, formally, our language L of events will become a union Tr ∪ St of the set Tr = {p, q, . . . } of transitions and a disjoint set St = {A, B, C, . . . } of state propositions (also called conditions or tests). Still, as before, finite sequences of events (from L * ) will be called processes, and we will use the letters a, b , c, . . . to denote such processes. Moreover, such processes will be assumed to satisfy all the postulates of dynamic inference, stated earlier, despite the fact that processes correspond now to mixed sequences of transitions and states. The actual difference with our basic, uniform setting will amount to a stipulation that states form a special kind of events that possesses some additional properties.
The distinction between states and transitions is actually much more subtle than it appears. Intuitively, states correspond to temporally extended occurrences with a relatively stable temporal behavior. As was argued in [10] , though physical states are never completely stationary, we usually assume that during a given state time passes while information remains fixed. Accordingly, states on our understanding include relatively static properties and facts (though extended in time), as well as cases of inertial change.
In a commonsense structuring of the dynamic universe, states are usually seen as boundaries, or limits of transitions and change, in the same sense as points play the role of boundaries of linear geometric segments. And just as in geometry, this role is two-fold. First, boundaries separate, and thereby single out, parts of the continuum. But on the other hand, they are links, or junctions, that combine these parts into larger pieces. This natural view of the continuum and its boundaries is not too familiar in our modern times, though it can be traced back at least to Aristotle. We owe this situation to the predominant alternative representation, namely the pointbased model of the continuum where these two functions are less transparent (though definable). Now we will turn to a syntactic description. The above understanding of states and transitions is embodied in the following extension of our basic dynamic calculus. Definition 7.1 A dynamic consequence relation in a two-sorted language will be called an ST-consequence relation if it satisfies the following additional rules for static propositions:
S-Identity
A A.
S-Monotonicity If ab c, then aAb c. S-Cut
If a A and aAb c, then ab c.
S-Expansion
If a bc and ab A, then a b Ac.
S-Reduction
If a b Ac, then a bc.
As a first example of the acquired possibilities of derivation in the above system, the following lemma shows formally that ST-consequence relations satisfy the permutation and contraction/dilution rules for state propositions.
Lemma 7.1 The following rules hold for ST-consequence relations:

Left Contraction
If Finally, we will mention the following property that will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 7.2 If s is a sequence of static propositions, then, for any a, a s holds if f a A, for any A that occurs in s.
Proof Let s = A 1 . . . A n . Now, the implication from left to right follows by S-Reduction. The other direction can be proved by induction on the length of s. Suppose that the claim holds for n − 1. Then a A 1 . . . A n−1 . But a A n implies aA 1 . . . A n−1 A n by S-Monotonicity, so a A 1 . . . A n−1 A n follows by SExpansion.
Trace calculus
In order to achieve 'freedom of expression' in working with state propositions, we will extend our dynamic calculus to a language that explicitly contains arbitrary sets of static propositions. Our main objective in this section will consist in showing that the resulting calculus in the extended language will still satisfy all the postulates of an ST-consequence relation.
Definition 7.2
• A trace is a finite sequence α = X 0 X 1 . . . X n , where each X i is either a proposition, or a set of static propositions.
• An instantiation of a trace α = X 0 X 1 . . . X n is a process x 1 x 2 . . . x n such that x i = X i , if X i is a proposition, or else x i is a finite sequence of (static) propositions taken from the set X i .
Traces can be viewed as folded representations of sets of processes having similar behavior. Clearly, ordinary processes can viewed as a special case of traces. Moreover, by the above definition, any process constitutes also a unique instantiation of itself.
As could be expected, due to contraction and permutation properties that hold for static propositions, any two instantiations of a trace that contain the same static propositions will have the same logical properties. It should be noted, however, that traces may include arbitrary, in particular infinite, sets of static propositions. For such traces, no instantiation can provide a complete information about the source trace. Note also that, even for fully finite traces, the number of instantiations is in general infinite due to possible repetitions and varying orders of appearance of static propositions in instantiation sequences.
Using these notions, we will extend the sequents of our calculus to rules that relate general traces by stipulating that such generalized rules will hold when certain ordinary sequents hold that relate corresponding instantiations. The first fact that we will note about the above generalization is that the resulting inference relation on traces is monotonic with respect to subsumption. It turns out to be convenient to view the above defined consequence relation on traces as a plain ST-consequence relation in the extended language obtained by adding arbitrary sets of static propositions as new static propositions. We will refer to this extended language as a trace language. The following result shows that this view has a solid formal support.
Theorem 7.4 If t is a trace inference corresponding to an ST-consequence relation , then t is an ST-consequence relation in the associated trace language, and it is a conservative extension of .
Proof The conservativity of t with respect to the source language follows immediately from the fact that the only instantiation of an ordinary process is the process itself.
In the proof below, we will repeatedly use the following construction on instantiations. Suppose that α is a trace, and let (Z 1 , . . . , Z k ) be the list of all sets of static propositions appearing in α (in that order). Then an instantiation of α amounts to replacement of every Z i in this list with a corresponding sequence of states. Suppose now that a 1 and a 2 are two instantiations of α that correspond, respectively, to two such lists (s 1 , . . . , s k ) and (t 1 , . . . , t k ) . Then it should be clear that the 'combined' list  (s 1 t 1 , . . . , s k t k ) also corresponds to some instantiation of α. The latter instantiation subsumes, in a sense, both a 1 and a 2 . We will denote this instantiation by a 1 +a 2 . Now we will check the validity of all the postulates of an ST-consequence relation for the trace inference. Identity is immediate. and a(b 1 +b ) c, therefore a (b +b 1 ) c by Cut, and consequently a bc by S-Reduction. Thus, α βγ holds.
Left Monotonicity
S-Identity
We need only to check the rule X X when X is a set of static propositions. By definition, this amounts to verifying that if s is a finite sequence of static propositions, then s s holds. Note first that, if A occurs in s, then s A follows from A A by S-Monotonicity. Hence s s holds by Lemma 7.2.
S-Monotonicity
Assume that αβ γ holds, c is an instantiation of γ , and let X be a single static proposition or a set of static propositions. Then there exist instantiations a of α and b of β such that ab c. Now if x is an instantiation of X, then axb c holds by S-Monotonicity. Therefore α Xβ γ holds.
S-Cut
Assume that α X and α Xβ γ , where X is either a static proposition, or a set of static propositions. Let c be an instantiation of γ . Then a 1 xb c, for some instantiations a 1 , x, b of α, X and β, respectively. In addition, α X implies that there exists an instantiation a 2 of α such that a 2 x. Let a = a 1 +a 2 . Then a x and axb c by S-Monotonicity. Now, if x is a single proposition, we obtain ab c by SCut. The same result also follows in the case when x is a set of static propositions, this time by using Lemma 7.2 and multiple applications of S-Cut. Hence αβ γ holds. 
S-Expansion
S-Reduction
Assume that α β Xγ , and let bc be an instantiation of βγ . If x is an instantiation of X, then b xc is an instantiation of β Xγ , so there exists an instantiation a of α such that a b xc. But then a bc by S-Reduction, so α βγ holds. This completes the proof.
The above result shows, in effect, that ST-consequence relations provide a necessary and sufficient basis for inference relations on arbitrary traces. This fact will be extensively used in the next section, where we will prove completeness of the corresponding sequential ST-calculus with respect to the relational semantics.
To end this section, we will mention an important property that we will use in what follows, namely that adjacent sets of static propositions can be safely united. Using the above property, any trace can be transformed into a trace in with all adjacent static sets are united. Such traces will be called regular, and they will be used in constructing the canonical model of our calculus.
Relational semantics
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to sequential consequence relations, since they have a simple relational semantics. It should be mentioned, however, that one of the main objectives of our general study consists in exploring the logical properties and representation capabilities of general dynamic inference, not only sequential one. We suspect, however, that it would require a more drastic generalization of the relational semantics than what has been suggested in the present paper.
Relational models for sequential ST-consequence relations can be defined as a straightforward extension of general relational models. We will keep intact the original definition of dynamic inference in plain relational models. Then the next lemma can be obtained by a straightforward verification of the rules for static propositions.
Lemma 8.1 If M is a relational ST-model, then M is a sequential ST-consequence relation.
In order to show that ST-consequence relations are also complete for this relational semantics, we are going to construct a canonical relational model of a consequence relation. As a matter of fact, it constitutes a generalization of the corresponding construction of a canonical relational model for sequential dynamic inference, described in [9] .
Canonical model
As a preparation, we will single out the following special kind of traces: Definition 8.2 A regular trace is a finite alternating sequence
where each p i is a transition, and every X i is a set of static propositions.
Regular traces constitute, in a sense, a canonical structural representation of ST-processes, since they explicitly embody the fact that sub-sequences of static propositions behave essentially as sets. Thus, any process a corresponds to a unique regular trace (that will be denoted byâ) obtained by grouping all maximal segments of static propositions into sets. Moreover, by using contraction and permutation properties of static propositions, it is easy to verify thatâ is inferentially equivalent to a, that is, for any trace β, β â if and only if β a, andâ β if and only if a β.
For a regular trace α = X 0 p 1 X 1 . . . p n X n , l(α) will denote X n . Also, we will use α i to denote a regular prefix
, in which case it will be taken to be a (regular) trace
Finally, we will say that a regular trace
It is easy to verify that, for any regular trace α = X 0 p 1 X 1 . . . p n X n , there exists a least S-closed trace that subsumes α; it is obtained by replacing every X i in α with the set X i = {A ∈ St | α In addition to regular traces, we will follow [9] and use trace-pairs: sequences of the form α|β, where α, β are regular traces such that α β. A trace-pair α|β will be said to be S-closed if A ∈ l(β i ), for any static proposition A such that αβ i A. Moreover, for an arbitrary trace-pair α|β, we will denote by cl(α|β) the trace pair obtained from α|β by replacing each l(β i ) with
As can be seen from the above definition, cl(α|β) has the form α|β , where β subsumes β. Moreover, using S-Expansion, it is easy to verify that if α β, then α β . So, cl(α|β) is indeed a trace-pair. It can be viewed as a least S-closed tracepair that contains α|β. Now, given a dynamic consequence relation , we will construct a canonical transition model M = (S , P, F) as follows:
• The set of states S is a set of all regular S-closed traces and trace-pairs.
• For any transition p ∈ P, (s, t) ∈ F( p) if one of the following cases holds:
-s and t are traces, and t = spX, for some X ⊆ St; -s is a trace, and t = cl(β| ), for some trace β such that (s, β) ∈ F( p); -s = α|β and t = α|βpX, for some X ⊆ St.
• For any state proposition A,
It is easy to see that the above construction determines a relational ST-model. We will prove first the following technical result.
Proof By a simultaneous induction on the length of a. The corresponding inductive bases hold by definition of F. Z below denotes an arbitrary proposition.
1. If s, t ∈ S are traces, then (s, t) ∈ F(aZ ) iff there is a trace r ∈ S such that (s, r) ∈ F(a) and (r, t) ∈ F(Z ). By the inductive assumption, (s, r) ∈ F(a) iff there is a trace γ 1 â such that r = s · γ 1 . Also, (r, t) ∈ F(Z ) iff there is a trace γ 2 Ẑ such that t = r · γ 2 . Now let γ = γ 1 · γ 2 . Clearly, γ â Z and t = s · γ . Moreover, suppose that the last two conditions hold. If Z is a transition, then γ has the form γ 1 pX, where γ 1 â. Hence we can define a state r as t · γ 1 , and then we will have (s, r) ∈ F(a) and (r, t) ∈ F(Z ), as required. In case Z is a static proposition, the same outcome is achieved by putting r to be equal to t. 2. (α|β, t) ∈ F(aZ ) iff there exists a state s such that (α|β, s) ∈ F(a) and (s, t) ∈ F(Z ). By the inductive assumption, (α|β, s) ∈ F(a) iff s = α|β · γ , for some trace γ â. Hence t is also a trace-pair by the definition of F. Now, if Z is a state proposition, then (s, t) ∈ F(Z ) holds iff s = t and A ∈ l(γ ). But then γ subsumes (â Z ), and t = α|β · γ . Conversely, if t = α|β · γ , for some γ (â Z ), then γ â), and we have both (α|β, t) ∈ F(a) (by the inductive assumption) and (t, t) ∈ F(Z ), as required. In case Z is a transition, say p, we have t = α|(β · γ ) · pX, for some set X ⊆ St. Then we let γ 0 = γ · pX, which gives us t = α|β · γ 0 and γ 0 (âp 
since (s, t) ∈ F(a), we have (s, β) ∈ F(aZ ). Conversely, if (s, β) ∈ F(aZ ), there is a trace t such that (s, t) ∈ F(a) and (t, β) ∈ F(Z ). But then (t, cl(β| )) ∈ F(Z ), and hence (s, cl(β| )) ∈ F(aZ ).
This completes the proof. Suppose first that t is a trace. Then s is also a trace, and we have s ·â t by the preceding lemma. In this case we define r = cl(t ·b ) Note that a b implies a s 0 , soâ s 0 and consequently t s 0 by Left Monotonicity and subsumption. Hencê b 0 ⊆ l(t) (since t is S-closed), and r is well-defined. Also, since t is already S-closed, r = t · γ , for some γ b . Consequently, (t, r) ∈ F(b ) by the preceding lemma, as required.
Suppose now that t is a trace-pair α|β. Then we will define a state r as cl(α|β ·b ). By the preceding lemma, we have to show only that r ∈ S , that is, r is well-defined, and α βb . Two cases should be considered here. Assume first that s is a tracepair α|β 0 . Then t = cl(α|β 0 ·â) by the preceding lemma, hence β subsumes β 0 ·â, and therefore a b implies β b . Since t is S-closed, the latter implies that β ·b is defined, so r is well-defined. Moreover, we also have α β (since t is a state), and consequently α βb follows by Cut. Hence (s, t) ∈ F(a) by the preceding lemma, and therefore there must exist a state r such that (t, r) ∈ F(b ). Using the previous lemma once more, the latter implies r =ã|l(ã) · γ , for some γ b , which is well-defined only ifã l(ã)γ . But thenã γ by S-Reduction (since l(ã) is a set of static propositions), and thereforẽ a b by subsumption. Nowâ b follows by Lemma 8.2, which reduces to a b by permutation and contraction properties for static propositions. This completes the proof.
The above theorem is sufficient for establishing strong completeness of our STcalculus with respect to the relational semantics:
Corollary 8.5 (Completeness) is a sequential ST-consequence relation if and only
= M , for some relational ST-model M.
Conclusions and prospects
As we mentioned in the introduction, the present study constitutes only a first stage in a prospective development of a comprehensive formalism for causal dynamic reasoning. Hopefully, we have succeeded in showing, however, that the suggested substructural formalism has significant representation capabilities and depth that justify further development. Still, a lot of things need to be added to our basic structural calculus in order to fulfil its purpose. The first required extension of the formalism presented above consists in augmenting the underlying language with appropriate logical connectives. This will raise our abstract structural formalism to a full-fledged logic. Actually, a basic logic of this kind has been suggested in [2] . It is based on (dynamic versions of) ordinary propositional connectives of conjunction, disjunction and negation, but is shown to have the same expressive capabilities as propositional dynamic logic (PDL).
One of the major objectives of our 'research program' consists in providing a solid logical basis for a general theory of action and change in AI that would be able to cope with temporally extended actions, concurrency and triggered (natural) events. At least, this will require an extension of our calculus to a concurrent dynamic logic. In addition, the formalism should be able to cope with traditional AI problems of inertia, frame, ramification and qualification. This would require a corresponding extension to a nonmonotonic formalism that implements the idea of inertia in a systematic way. These are the subjects of the ongoing work.
Finally, it should be mentioned that our calculus apparently provides an enhanced starting point for studying the process of computation itself. In particular, our main notion of causal inference, being restricted to (voluntary) computing actions, coincides, in effect, with the relation of enabling used in event theories of computation (see, e.g, [13] for the present stage of development). In addition, the main problems in describing concurrent actions and change in AI are actually species of the general task of describing distributed processes and distributed computation. All this suggests that a further development of our formalism along these lines could be beneficial for both these fields. Moreover, it will hopefully provide a better understanding of the basic principles of logical reasoning in dynamic domains.
